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AN ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION AS A
METHOD OF MAINTAINING AGRICULTURAL
AND OPEN SPACE LAND USES
BARRY A. CURRIR*
INTRODUCTION

Each year in this country thousands of acres of land turn from the greens
and browns in which nature has clothed them to the neon brightness and
gray-concrete dullness that frequently signifies the outward march of the
city. The public outcry to slow or stop the conversion of open space land to
urban/suburban uses is predictable in light of the rather staggering statistics
that environmentalists and others assemble.' The responses of policymakers
to this situation have been diverse. A program that has attracted significant
attention as a means to curb the disappearance of undeveloped land is one
that treats farm or open space land specially for property tax purposes.
Such programs generally result in a lower tax bill for the owner of such land.
This is an intriguing phenomenon because a significant number of studies
- by far the majority of those done- have concluded that such programs
will not have a significant impact on the pace at which undeveloped land
disappears.
These tax relief measures have been given various labels. In this analysis
they will be generally referred to as differential taxation programs. 2 Their
common characteristic is that qualifying land is assessed at its value in its

qualifying use 3 with the tax rates being applied to that valuation. More than
forty states have such differential tax programs providing special property
tax treatment for land in agricultural, recreational and other open space

uses 4 Current programs are aimed at and primarily benefit agricultural uses;

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. A.B., 1968, University of California
at Los Angeles; J.D., 1971, University of Southern California. The substance of this article
was presented in February, 1978, at a conference on tax policies to achieve land use goals
at the University of Southern California Law Center.
1. For instance, an official of the United States Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service reported recently that at least 2,000,000 acres of farmable land is lost
each year to development. Ulman, Role for Government in Saving Farmland Gets Boost
From New Massachusetts Law, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
2. This term is broad enough to encompass the several distinct approaches usually

considered together as tax relief programs for farmers and owners of open space land.
Two frequently used names for these programs, "preferential assessment" and "deferred
taxation," are given specific meanings here, referring to particular types of programs within
the broader category of differential taxation programs. See notes 31-42 infra.
3. See notes 7-10 infra and accompanying text.
4. Relatively current citations to these programs are provided in REGIONAL ScxmcE
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only about one-third of the existing schemes include recreational or other
open space uses within those eligible for tax relief.
Differential taxation has been promoted in part by the role it can play
in preserving recreational or environmentally important open space. Most
states, however, have not utilized the concept for that purpose; therefore,
the data from which to draw any conclusions about the viability of such
programs in more densely populated areas is insufficient. The lack of undeveloped land in urban areas and the historical reliance on government to
provide parks and other recreational facilities may make the implementation
of a differential tax program for this purpose in settled areas somewhat
problematical.
An initial remark about the scope of this article must be made. Differential
taxation programs have objectives in addition to the preservation of open
space and farm land. It is often alleged that farmers pay too much property
tax because (1) farmers pay much more tax relative to the services they
receive than do non-farmers in the same tax jurisdiction, and (2) vis-a-vis
non-farmers their income is low in relationship to the amount of land they
own and on which they are taxed.5 As a matter of equity, then, farmers
ought to be given some relief from their property tax burden. An easy way
to accomplish this is through a differential tax program. This article does
not focus on the desirability of using differential taxation as a means of
bolstering the farmer's income. 6 Rather, the inquiry here is whether differential tax schemes can play a positive role in the* preservation of open
space. Certainly, however, if differential tax programs cannot be justified
as helping to maintain desirable land uses, critical analysis of other functions
of these programs will be essential.
PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING USE-VALUE

Although all differential taxation programs share the characteristic that
land in the program is assessed for property tax purposes differently from
other land in the tax unit, there is no unanimity as to how the assessment
should be made. The objective is to eliminate the speculative or development
value that increases the value of farm or open space land well beyond what
it is or will be worth for those uses. A crude way to accomplish this would
be to assess qualified land at a percentage lower than is applied to all other
UNTAXING OPEN SPACE 20-21 (Council on Environmental Quality)
[hereinafter cited as UNTAXING OPEN SPACE]; and Nelson, Differential Assessment of
RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Agricultural Land in Kansas: A Discussion and a Proposal, 25 KAN. L. REV. 215, n.4 (1977).
5. R. GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND IMPACT

10-11 (International Association of Assessing Officers 1974); Hady & Sibold, State Programs
for the Differential Assessment of Farm and Open Space Land, 256 AGRICULTURE ECON. REP.
6, (United States Department of Agriculture 1974); cf. Henke, Preferential Property Tax
Treatment for Farmland, 53 OR. L. REv. 1,17, 126-27 (1974).
6. Generally, analysts have concluded that differential taxation programs provide needed
income relief for farmers. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 53; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra
note 4, at 44-45. Whether the program is a fair way to relieve the farmer's income squeeze is a

complicated question and will not be considered in detail here. See generally, id. at 80-99.
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land subject to the property tax.7 Most states have chosen more complicated
methods of assessing land to be differendaly taxed in order to more closely
approximate the value of such land for the qualifying use. These complex
methods should result in an assessment low enough to have the intended effect,
but not so low that these landowners are too favorably treated vis-a-vis all
other property taxpayers.
The problems with determining a use-value for agricultural and open
space land stem from the scarcity of comparable sales of such property for
those limited purposes. This lack of data makes difficult the accurate calculation of the fair market value of the. land for such uses. Once the owner
of farm or open space land decides to sell, his natural objective is to obtain
the highest price possible for the property. Even if the eventual purchaser
intends to continue the prior use, he will have to bid against all those who
are interested in the property. These other bidders would include developers
and other investors whose offering prices take into account the development
value of the property. Thus, sales of proximate parcels sufficiently similar to
be "comparable" will partially reflect the speculative value of the land. Indeed,
the theory of differential taxation legislation assumes that most sales of farm
and open space land will reflect the development value. If not, the program
would seem to be unnecessary.
In the absence of comparable sales to use as a basis for the use-value
assessment, techniques that have been utilized include the capitalization
of income method and a soil productivity rating system.$ The capitalization
of income method yields a use-value assessment when the annual income
from the use of the land is divided by a capitalization rate that represents
a reasonable return on the landowner's investment. Soil productivity rating
systems are based on the quality of the land for agricultural purposes. This
may be preferable to the capitalization approach in that it might encourage
the highest and best agricultural use of the qualifying land rather than
accepting for assessment purposes the minimal farming activity in which
speculators might choose to engage in order to secure the reduced tax rate.9
Very little attention has been given to the land use consequences of these
different methods of determining use-value and the effects of shifting from
one method of valuation to another have not been studied. Also unsettled
is the utility of the assessment techniques used for agricultural land in
assessing open space land. Certainly the soil rating approach to valuation has
7. Assessment of property for property tax purposes at less than 100 percent of actual

value has been authorized by various means including a
TENN. CONsT. art. 2, §28(a)-(d) (1977 Supp.) (farm and
25 percent of value; industrial and commercial property
public utility property assessed at 55 percent of value),

state constitutional requirement,
residential property assessed at
assessed at 40 percent of value;
and a state statute, KAN. STAT.

§79-1439 (1969) (assessed value to equal 30 percent of actual value). Even without constitutional or statutory authority, some assessors in practice use an assessment ratio of less
than 100 percent, thereby affording farmland preferential treatment. See 0. OL.MAN & F.
SCHOETrLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXEs AND FINANCES 243-89 (1974). See note 57 infra.
8. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 15-17; Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation
in the Land Use Planning Process, 51 IND. L.J. 27, 76-77 (1975).
9. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 18.
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no application to open space land valuation. Capitalization of income would
be hard to apply where property is not generating income. Appraisal experts
are turning their attention. to these and other problems in the operation
of differential taxation programs.' 0 Perhaps more refined techniques for
assessing agricultural and open space land will emerge in the near future
as a result of their efforts.
Other potential problems for differential taxation programs, are questions
about the legality of affording this sort of tax relief." Does differential taxation run afoul of a state constitutional command that that property be assessed
at its full or true value? Does differential taxation violate a requirement that
all property be taxed uniformly? Similarly, does differential taxation violate
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution or a state
constitution by singling out certain land uses for special property tax treatment? These are difficult questions. Nonetheless, these questions have not
deterred most of the states from adopting some type of differential taxation
program. Where the legal barriers to the program were substantial, state
constitutional amendments have been passed to clarify the legality of the
program. 12 Since the legal questions have not impeded the growth of the
differential taxation concept, they will not be considered in detail here.
THE RANGE__OF DIFFERENTIAL TAX PROGRAMS

Considerable variety exists among differential tax programs that have
been created by state legislatures. It is useful and interesting to compare
and contrast the approaches taken. In this section, attention will be given
to the type of use that qualifies for special tax treatment, the inducement
offered or penalty imposed to keep land in the program and its open space
use, and the way in which programs are administered - specifically the division of responsibilities between state and local governments for promoting
and operating the program.
The Coverage of Differential Taxation Programs
All differential taxation programs include land used for agricultural purposes among those land uses eligible for special tax treatment. Twelve states
also provide some coverage of undeveloped land of scenic, environmental or

10. See, e.g., Schott & White, Multiple Regression Analysis of Farmland Values by
Land Classes, 45 APPRAISAL J. 427 (1977); Wise, Modifying the Income Approach to Farm
Appraisal, 45 APPRAISAL J. 505 (1977).
I1. See generally, Currier, supra note 8, at 41-44; Hagman, Open Space Planning and
Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 628, 640-45; Lapping, Bevins &
Herbers. Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to Preserve Missouri's Farmlands,
42 Mo. L. Rav. 369, 278-81 (1977); Nelson, supra note 4, at 280-35.
12. Maryland was the first state to adopt a differential tax program in 1956. That
law was declared unconstitutional in State Tax Commissioner v. Wakefield, 222 Md. 543,
161 A.2d 676 (1960). The next year constitutional amendments were passed that would
have validated the program and it was reenacted. See MD. DEcLARAnON oF RIrrs, arts.
15, 43; MD. CoDE ANN. §19(b) (Supp. 1974).
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historical significance. 3 A smaller number of states, eight according to4 the
latest compilation, allow tax relief for land in certain recreational uses.Usually, qualifying agricultural uses are broadly defined in the legislation creating a differential tax program. 5 Allowable uses range from relatively obscure activities such as beekeeping 6 and the raising of flowersYr to
more common pursuits such as growing crops, fruits and vegetables and
raising livestock.:' Often, however, additional eligibility requirements are
imposed on the landowner or the land to promote the particular public
policies to which the law is directed.
One such public policy is that the tax advantage the program creates
inure only to the benefit of farmers, not to speculators. 19 To achieve this
result, several approaches have been devised.20 In Missouri, for example,
in order to qualify land for preferential assessment, it must be shown that
gross sales of agricultural products from that land have averaged at least
$2500 annually over a five year period. 2 ' An alternative to this single gross
sales measurement employs a standard of income per acre in order to
eliminate coverage of owners of large tracts who derive only a nominal
income from their farming operations. 22 Other variations on this theme
include the requirement that a certain percentage of family income be
derived from farming operations 23 or that the property be in the owner's
family or used for an eligible purpose for a certain number of years.24 Several
states use a combination of these eligibility requirements or employ them as
25
alternative ways of qualifying for property tax relief.
Each of these limiting eligibility requirements potentially excludes the
very individuals or land uses that differential tax schemes are designed to
18. UNTAXING OPEN SPAcE, supra note 4, at 13.

14. Id.
15. For example, in Florida preferential taxation is available only to land used pri-

marily for bona fide agricultural purposes. The phrase is defined to mean "good faith
commercial agricultural use of the land." FLA. STAT. §193.461(8)(b)
16.

OR. REv. STAT. §215.208(2)

(1977).

(1977).

17. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 18.
18. VA. CODE §58-769.5(a), (b) (Supp. ,1077).
19. The availability of the tax benefit to speculators or owners of land not under
development pressure has always been a problem with differential tax programs. See, Alden
& Shockro, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Lands: Preservation or Discrimination?,
42 So. CAL. L. REv. 59, 68 (1969); Hagman, supra note 11, at 646-52.
20. Hady & Sibold, supra note 5, at 4-5.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. §187.017(4) (Supp. 1975). For a general discussion of Missouri's
1
approach, see Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, supra note 11, at 872-76.
22. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:4-283.5 (West Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §59-5-89

(Supp. 1977).
28. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. §29.53.085(c) (Supp. 1976) (amending ALASKA STAT. §29.53.035(c)
(1962) (25 percent); TEx. CONsr. art. 8, §.lLd(a).
24. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §50la-1 (Supp. 1978) (three years); OR. REv. STAT.
§808.870(2) (1977) (two years).
25. In Utah, for instance, receipts from farming must equal at least $250 per acre
or the owner must derive at least 80 percent of his gross income from the land sought
to be enrolled -in the differential tax program. UTAH CODE ANN. §59-5-89 (Supp. 1977)
(amending UTAH CODE ANN. §59-5-89 (1975)).
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protect. However, if it is important to the viability or equity of the tax
scheme to exclude speculators, the relevant question is how many bona fide
farmers are excluded by the added eligibility criteria and how many speculators are able to qualify for the program despite these criteria. 26 Whatever
standards are decided upon, the objective is to minimize both the legitimate
claimants who are excluded and the illegitimate claimants who are included.
Although differential taxation programs have been most frequently
analyzed in their relation to farmland preservation, a number of these
programs provide tax benefits for land in other open space or recreational
uses. Two factors are often utilized to determine whether such land can
qualify for special tax treatment as "open space land." The first of these
is designation of the land as open space land by a comprehensive land use
plan or zoning scheme. 27 The second method commonly used to qualify land
for preferred tax status involves a formal petition by the landowner requesting a determination by appropriate authorities that the preservation of the
land in its present open space use would enhance natural or scenic resources,
protect water resources, conserve soils or marshes, enhance the public value
of abutting open space, enhance recreation opportunities, preserve historic
sights, or retain in its natural character urban tracts of five or more acres
28
open to some form of public use.
A small number of states have authorized tax relief for land in certain
recreational uses.2 1 This type of provision usually supplements the coverage
of open space uses and will apply to land dedicated to boating, camping,
swimming, horseback riding, or golfing uses. The primary beneficiary of these
programs appears to have been the country club.30
Methods of Providing Property Tax Relief
Once the decision is made regarding those land uses to be included in
a differential tax scheme, policymakers must select an appropriate mechanism
to provide relief. There are two significant objectives. First, the program
should be structured to enroll as much of the targeted land as possible.
Second, the program should preserve the land in its desired use, rather
than just delay its development or facilitate the holding of land for development by giving a low tax bill to the owner who will sell or develop the
property at the earliest opportunity. Arguably, these two goals are conflicting.
To enroll the maximum amount of land, the program should have the fewest
26. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 222. These errors probably occur because speculators
receive the tax break rather than because bona fide farmers are being denied it. Certainly
this would be true of schemes that automatically cover all eligible land. E.g., IND. CODE
§6-1.1-4-13 (Supp. 1975). Attempts to more precisely refine the eligibility criteria are
likely to be challenged on legal giounds. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
27. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-107(2) (1975).
28. WASH. REv. CODE §84.34.020(1) (Supp. 1977).
29. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. §42-136 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. §193.501 (1977).
30. Maryland authorizes special tax treatment for country clubs. MD. TAX & REv. CODE
ANN. §19(3) (1975). A report on the operation of Oregon's Program indicates that 80
percent of the property that was preferentially assessed as open space land was devoted
to golf course use. UNTAXING OPEN SPAcE, supra note 4, at 207.
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possible disincentives to participation. Requiring the land to remain in the
qualifying use for a stated period of time or imposing a penalty when the
owner desires to withdraw his land from the program could discourage many
landowners from participating. Yet such measures are the surest way to
keep land in the desired use.
Three distinct approaches to differential taxation have evolved: preferential assessment, deferred taxation and the restrictive agreement. They reflect
different judgments regarding the proper mixture of incentives to enroll land
and disincentives to withdraw land from a differential tax program. Each

approach depends upon the assessment of the land in its qualifying use
rather than upon the determination of the land's value for property tax
purposes according to its fair market value.
Pure preferential assessment programs3 ' provide tax benefits to owners
of eligible land by computing the tax on the basis of the land's use value.
Taxation on such a basis continues as long as the land remains in the
qualifying use. The owner is not penalized if at any time the eligible land
is converted into a non-qualifying land use. The preferential assessment may
be granted to all qualifying land in a tax unit 32 or given only to land that
is zoned or planned for eligible uses. 33 Other variations exist among pure
preferential assessment programs. For example, in some programs the landowner must apply for preferential assessment and his reduced tax bill; in
other states the tax benefit is granted to all qualifying land whether or not
an application for such preferential assessment has been made.34
Generally a pure preferential assessment program is the most advantageous to the landowner. The tax benefit is received without any promise
on his part to maintain the land in current use. From the standpoint of the
community, there are both advantages and disadvantages to this particular
approach. Reduced property taxes may increase the likelihood that land
will be retained in the desired open space or agricultural use.3 5 The disadvantage is that the revenue lost on conferring the tax advantage must
be recaptured somewhere else and owners of non-qualifying land in the
tax jurisdiction probably will have to bear this expense.3
31. The following states' programs can be classified as representing the pure preferential
assessment variety: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida (agricultural uses),
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. For statutory citations see UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
32. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 9, §8330 (1974).
33. Wyo. STAT. §39-1-106 (1977). In Florida a landowner may lose the preferential
assessment if he requests and obtains a rezoning of his property to a nonagricultural use
or if he records a subdivision plat with respect to the property. FLA. STAT. §193A61(4)(a)
(1977). Furthermore, land may be classified nonagricultural by county commissioners if
continued agricultural use of the property will inhibit orderly expansion of nearby urban
area. FLA. STAT. §193.461(4) (b) (1977).
34. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. §137.019.1(2) (Supp. 1978) (annual application for preferential assessment required) with IND. CODE ANN. §6-1-26-3 (Burns 1978) (all land in
agricultural use shall be preferentially assessed).
35. Non-participating land, however, may be developed earlier or more intensively.
Currier, supra note 8, at 82.
86. See notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text.
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Deferred taxation programs also provide for the determination of a
qualifying landowner's property tax bill on the basis of its value in the
qualifying use. 37 These programs differ from pure preferential assessment
schemes because upon a change to a non-qualifying use some recapture is
made of the taxes the landowner has saved through the program. This additional feature is arguably justified on two counts. Recapture forces the landowner, upon sale or development of his property, to return to the community
38
a portion of the benefits previously received due to preferred tax status.

This may be particularly equitable because the earlier benefits were probably
subsidized by higher taxes on non-qualifying property.3 9 Further, and probably
crroneously, it is believed by some that the charge will deter those who have
40
been receiving tax benefits from converting land to a non-qualifying use.
How the payment is determined when land is transferred from an eligible
to an ineligible use varies from state to state. These programs can be an
administrative burden. In some programs the property must be assessed each
year at both its fair market value and use value. 41 The amount of tax benefit
received can then be computed using those figures and the tax rate for each
year, with recapture constituting a portion of the tax benefit received. The
43
42
number of years' benefit that will be recaptured ranges from two to twenty
37. These schemes are the most popular. Some 25 states have adopted deferred tax
programs: Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia
and Washington. Citations to specific statutory sections can be found in UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
38. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 42; Hagman, supra note 11, at 639; Nelson,
supra note 4, at 223-24.
39. See notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text.
40. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, .mupra note 4, at 68-76. This report concludes that while
there may be a slight additional deterrent to development from the imposition of a
recapture and/or penalty provision, the effects on land use of a deferred tax program are
not likely to differ substantially from those of a pure preferential assessment program.
This has become the general view. See, e.g., R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 41-42. Yet,
there is an undeniable appeal to the suggestion that putting this added cost on the development of farmland will inhibit such development. If it does not, intuition may suggest that
the charge is insufficiently low. Cf. Nelson, supralnote 4, at 223-24. Despite analysis to the
contrary, there remains a strong adherence to the belief that deferred tax programs will
inhibit development. See note 87 infra and accompanying text. This adherence, together
with the perception that this approach is fairer than pure preferential assessment, explains
why deferred taxation is the most frequently utilized differential taxation scheme.
41. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §132.450(2) (g) (Supp. 1977). The more land in an area enrolled
in a program, the more difficult it is to make a fair market value assessment, especially
if there are few sales of comparable land.
42. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1978).
43. A provision of Hawaii's program provides for 20 year dedications of land to a
qualified use. Upon such dedication the land will be assessed at only 50 percent of its
use value. Conversion of enrolled land will result in all deferred taxes becoming due plus
a ten percent penalty. However, notice of cancellation or enrollment can be given in the
nineteenth year and the land when converted after the twentieth year with no recapture
of the tax benefit received. HAwAi Rxv. STAT. §246-12(c) (Supp. 1977). See UNTAXING OPEN
SPAcE, supra note 4, at 164-201.
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with an average of about five years.4 4 In other programs the assessor need
not make a yearly calculation of the fair market value of all enrolled land.
Rather, at the time of change to a non-eligible use, he determines the fair
market value and a charge is levied based upon the current difference between
the fair market value and the use value.4 5 This recaptures the tax benefit
and is administratively less cumbersome. However, the procedure complicates
an owner's calculation of his recapture liability should he sell his land and
makes less certain the redistribution of the tax burden within a taxing unit4
As an additional incentive to keep land in the program, a number of states
47
also charge interest on the deferred taxes that are due.
From the standpoint of the landowner, the third differential tax scheme
is the most burdensome. The restrictive agreement approach requires the
owner to contract with the relevant governmental unit for a term, generally
ten years, to keep his land in its qualifying use.48 Changing the use of the
land is a breach of that agreement and will lead to the imposition of a stiff
penalty. 40 Although the governmental unit may be empowered to bring an
action to specifically enforce the contract5 0 apparently this power is not
utilized. Thus, as with deferred tax programs, the owner may be able to
develop his property whenever he believes it makes economic sense, although
he will be penalized for doing so.51 Restrictive agreements are arguably more
desirable from the community's standpoint because the community itself is
a necessary party to the contract and can control to some extent the location
and quantity of land benefitting from a reduced tax burden. 5 2 However,
the cost of this control may be too high. Stiffer penalties than provided by
deferred tax schemes may deter some owners from enrolling in the program.
Nonetheless, the restrictive agreement method, like preferential assessment
and deferred tax programs, strikes a balance between the competing policies
of enrolling the land area that the community would like to see retained in
agricultural or open space use and preventing certain owners from taking
44. Id. at 18.

..

45. E.g., OR. REV. STAT.. §308.397 (11977).
46. UN AxiNG OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 102.
47. Id. at 18; R. GLouDEmAii, suPTa note 5, at 20-21. See, e.g., VA. CoDE §58-769.10
(Supp. 1978) (six percent interest on the tax deferred).
48. This approach has been the least popular. It is utilized in California, Florida
(regarding outdoor recreational and park uses), Michigan, New Hampshire and Vermont.
For specific statutory citations, see UNTAXING OPN SPACE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
- 49. In California the penalty is,12.5 percent of market value. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE,
supra note 4. at 284. In Washington, a breach of the restrictive agreement triggers
recapture of the tax benefit plus a 20 percent penalty. WAsH. REv. CoDE §84-84.080 (Supp.
1,977). These programs provide various ways of terminating or ending the agreement.
In California, for example, the agreement is automatically extended each year for an
additional year. Upon notice of non-renewal, -the property is assessed gradually closer and
closer to fair market value. Thus, at the end of the tenth year the preferential assessment
has disappeared. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, -sup a note 4, at 279-84.
50. E.g., CAL. Gov'r. CODE §51251 (West Supp. 1978).
51. Nelson, supra note 4, at 224-25.
52. Of course, an owner must secure all necessary governmental approval for any
development such as obtaining the proper zoning for the intended use.
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advantage of the program by deriving both large gains from tax savings and
profits from the development of their land.
Administration of Differential Taxation Programs
States impose differing responsibilitiess on state and local governments
in the operation and administration of differential taxation programs. These
distinctions in part are reflections of the differences inherent in the type of
differential tax program adopted. For instance, because of the longer duration and the need for negotiation of restrictive agreements, jurisdictions with
such programs often rely on local governments to identify and enroll desirable land in the program. 53 Pure preferential assessment and deferred tax
schemes, on the contrary, are mandated at the state level and generally do
not require or depend on. the participation of local governments.54 Other
significant differences among the programs include the amount of discretion
afforded local assessors in determining the method of computing use-value
and the assessment procedure employed once the method has been decided
upon. 55 Most statutory schemes provide some guidelines for assessors to use
in determining use-value. However, variations among areas of a state are
still possible. For instance, if soil productivity ratings are to be used to
determine the use-value of farmland, a determination must be made as to
whether the local assessor or a state-level assessor should be empowered to
determine the productivity of a particular parcel of land.58
THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION ON OPEN SPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL LAND

Assessment of Farm and Open Space Land in the
Absence of a Differential Tax Program
A basic assumption of differential tax schemes is that a reduction of
tax bills will help maintain land in open space or agricultural uses. The
reduced tax results from applying the appropriate tax rate to the use-value
assessment of land rather than to the full fair market value assessment that
would normally be used in the computation. The tax reduction, then, is a
53. For a California landowner to receive a reduced assessment, his property must be
within an agricultural preserve that is designated by a county or city. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§51230 (West Supp. 1978). In addition, he must enter into a contract with the city or
county to restrict the use of his land for a period of at least ten years. CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§51240-51285 (West Supp. 1978).
54. Nevertheless, because some of these programs depend on governmental activity
such as the promulgation of zoning ordinances, the local governments may have some
involvement.
55. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
56. Compare the practice in Indiana with that in Maryland. Both states have developed
soil productivity ratings for agricultural land. In Indiana local assessors utilize ratings
as basic guidelines and retain a large amount of discretion on the determination of land
productivity. In Maryland soil productivity maps have been formulated at the state
level and are used by assessors in conjunction with tax maps to determine how much land
falls into each soil classification. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 128-30, 133-34.
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function of the difference between the use-value and fair market value assessments. Thus, if this difference between the use-value and fair market value
assessments is minimal, few tax dollars will be saved by the owner and there
will be little incentive to the owner to maintain the desired use.
A way by which the tax break might be minimized is if land in a qualifying use is being assessed at less than its full fair market value. It has been
suggested that in many instances assessors informally assess agricultural land
dose to its use-value rather than at its fair market value. 57 Further, regardless of the method used in assessing a parcel, farmland is commonly listed
on the tax rolls at a lower percentage of its value than other real estate. 58
Thus, farmland apparently has been receiving a tax benefit of some magnitude
for a number of years.
Due to these variable assessment practices, it is difficult to predict the
impact of a differential tax scheme. Conceivably, the assessed valuation of
agricultural land would increase. 55 Such a result is unlikely, however, and is
inconsistent with the objectives of differential tax programs. Further, since
these programs are generally voluntary, owners of qualifying land would
not be likely to enroll until they perceived a benefit from the program.
However, tax bills of participants in a differential tax program still might
rise. A tax rate increase might be necessary to offset the decline in the tax
base when use-value assessment is initiated. Where the tax base is primarily
agricultural, an individual's property tax bill could be greater than before
the commencement of a differential tax program if the reduction in the
assessed value does not completely offset the higher tax rate the program
necessitated. 60
Even if farmland is underassessed in practice, differential tax programs
might still help relieve the farmer's tax burden and promote the maintenance
of land in agricultural use. The less than full fair market value assessment
or reporting of farmland at a lower percentage of value than other real
estate might not fully reflect the difference in value between fair market
and actual use-values of the land. Moving to a differential tax program
would, therefore, reduce further the landowner's tax bill.
Arguments for preferential assessment of farmland may also be in anticipation of calls for reforms in the general property tax system aimed at
improving the uniformity of assessment between farm and non-farm property
or between rural and non-rural areas of a state. 61 Assuming low assessments
of farmland, differential taxation programs would avoid property tax increases
57. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 28-30.
58.

Id.

59. Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, supra note 11, at 382.
60. In particular circumstances, the tax bills of participants in a differential taxation
program might actually increase. The initiation of such a program would result in a
decline in the tax base, with a corresponding decrease in tax revenues. The obvious

method of restoring revenues to previous levels would be through a tax rate increase.
In such an instance, an individual's property tax bill could be greater than its pre-program
level if the reduction in assessed value did not completely offset the rise in the tax rate.
Such a possibility has been noted by Gloudemans. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 37.
61. See id. at 28.
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that might result from general reforms to the property tax system even though
there would not be significant reductions from the tax payments farmers had
been making.
There is little in the literature to suggest that the same under-assessment
that has been found with respect to agricultural land exists for land in other
open space uses. However, some basis for suggesting that a tax advantage
accrues to the owner of open space land from the manner in which the
property tax is administered is provided by a recent study by George Peterson
and others considering the effect of property taxes on the provision of housing
2
in urban areas.(
Peterson reported that owners of land in parts of an urban area where
land and property values were increasing at an above average rate were taxed
at a lower effective tax rate than those in areas where land and property
values were falling. 63 This occurred despite the fact that state law mandated
uniform taxation within the tax units studied. Although his study did focus
on developed land in cities,64 the phenomenon Peterson observed may be
present as well when comparing the effective tax rate on open space land
at the urban fringe with other parts of an urban/suburban area. There exists
a belief that property values on the urban fringe are rapidly increasing and
rising at an above average rate. Indeed, this perception is part of the basis
on which support for differential taxation programs has been built. It would
appear that this urban fringe land is comparable to developed land in
upwardly transitional neighborhoods, that, according to Peterson, are taxed
at a lower effective rate than property in declining areas. This suburban area
at the fringe of development contains the open space land that differential
tax programs seek to maintain in open space use. In practice the current
property tax system may provide some tax advantage to owners of such land.
This advantage is analagous to the tax advantage received by owners of
agricultural land that actually may be underassessed.
If land devoted to farm and open space uses has been receiving some
de facto tax benefit, perhaps farmers, environmentalists and others interested
in preserving such land uses should remain silent rather than suggesting that
differential tax programs be adopted or expanded. Fear of abuse in the
property tax system is intensifying and will continue to grow as long as
property taxes rise. Advocates of tax relief for farm and open space uses
might as well confront those who suggest that this type of tax benefit ought
not to be allowed.
Furthermore, for participants in a differential taxation program, as well
as those who must pay increased taxes as a result of it, the tax expenditures
of the program should be accounted for so that reasoned judgments can be
made about its continuation and expansion. Reasoned judgments cannot
be made unless the program is formalized and satisfactory records kept.
62.

G. PETERSON,

AND THE CITIES

A.

SOLOMON,

H.

MADJID, &

W.

APGAR, JR., PROPERTY TAXES,

HOUSING

(1973).

63. Id. at 21-23.
64. Id. at 79-80.
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Finally, to the extent that the tax benefit results from the individual
assessor's activities, there may be a troubling inequality of treatment within
large tax areas or among tax areas within a state. A program should be
designed and administered to make the tax break available to all those

owning the type of land that such a program seeks to preserve in its existing
use. The tax benefits should not be dependent upon the whim and caprice
of the local assessor.
The Process by Which Land is Converted to Urban/Suburban Uses
To ascertain whether differential taxation will encourage the maintenance of land in agricultural or open space use, it is necessary to understand
how such land is converted to urban uses. Whether farm and other open
space land will be developed depends upon the supply of land for conversion
and the demand for such land. Differential tax programs assume a high
demand for land for conversion. 5 They attempt to slow down or control
the amount of land converted by providing tax benefits to landowners, thereby
reducing landowner incentive to release their land for development and thus,
effectively reducing the supply of land available for conversion. 6
Whether lower property taxes will affect the supply of land available

for development is open to question. An open space or agricultural landowner's decision to develop land or sell it for development is influenced

by a number of factors. Perhaps the primary consideration is the price at
which the land can be sold or the return that would be received if the

property were developed 67 Personal factors, however, also influence such a
decision. In Untaxing Open Space, a recent report issued by the Council on
Environmental Quality, the significance of these personal factors is explored. 6s

65. Cooke & Power, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Land, 47 FLA. B.J. 636, 640
(1973).
66. The likelihood of non-enrolled land being developed might well increase, however.
Less land for development on the market should mean a higher price for such land and more
or earlier sales. Higher land values means higher taxes and this will encourage early development. Sec Currier, supra note 8, at 82. Further, if owners closest to developed areas enroll
their land and refrain from or delay development, there may be increased pressure to
develop land further removed from urbanized areas. This would result in a, leapfrog
pattern of development. Adamson, Preferential Land Assessment in 'Virginia, 10 U. RICH.
L. R.Ev. 111, 119-20 (1975). It is likely, however, that few owners of land close to urban
areas will refuse the chance to cash in on the development value of their land. Lapping,
Bevins, & Herbers, sup'a note 11, at 383-84. A student of California's Williamson Act
demonstrates that participation levels increase as the distance from population centers
increases. G. Gustafson, The California Land Conservation Act of 1965: An Economic
Analysis of a New Took of Land Use Policy 65-67 (1973) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, U. Cal. at Berkeley).
67. The expectation of a large gain on the sale of agricultural land is a central reason
why owners do not participate in differential tax programs, for it may be difficult or
expensive to withdraw from the program when the right deal comes along. Carman,
California Landowners' Adoption of a Use-Value Assessment Program. 53 LAN ECON.
275 (1977); Hansen & Schwartz, Landowner Behavior at the Rural-Urban Fringe in Response
to Preferential Property Taxation, 51 LAND ECON. 341 (1975).
68. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 49-56.
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The report emphasizes the fact that retirement and death are among the
leading reasons for transfers of farmland or the conversion of farmland to
suburban usesY9 For example, in a study of forty sales of farmland in New
Jersey in the late 1960's, 22.4 percent of the reasons recited for the sale of
farmland were the retirement of the owner. 7 In a study of land sales in
Baltimore County, Maryland, death or retirement accounted for 42 percent
of all sales and 85 percent of the sales of land that eventually was developed
for residential use. 1' From a planning standpoint, these personal factors help
identify the particular owners who may be affected by the tax relief provided
by differential taxation programs.
Another determinant of the success of differential tax programs is the
dedication of landowners to the maintenance of their land in the desired
use. Some owners are committed to maintaining the current use of their
property and are unlikely to convert or sell it unless a continuation of the
present land use would be economically impracticable. Other landowners are
"speculators" who are merely waiting to convert their property until the

maximum profit can be extracted. A third group falls between the committed
farmer and the speculator. These are persons who would prefer to maintain
their land in agricultural or open space, but would willingly sell or convert
if the price is right.
This last group will be most influenced by the tax relief offered by differential tax programs. By reducing the carrying costs of the land, the differential tax program may cause the owner to delay conversion or sale or to
abandon the idea completely. Consequently, the success of a differential tax
program depends on the number of landowners who would like to keep their
land in its present use but are not committed to doing so.
Existing research has not focused satisfactorily on the role that personal
considerations and commitments to current land use play in the development
69. When the owner of farmland dies, the imposition of an estate tax can force the sale
or development of farmland to generate funds in order to pay the tax. This is particularly
likely if the land must be valued in the estate at its highest and best use. Congress was
aware of this problem and moved to provide some relief in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The House Report states: "[wjhen land is actually used for
inappropriate to value the land on the basis of its potential
ally since it is desirable to encourage the continued use of
[WAqhere the valuation of land reflects speculation to such a

farming purposes . . ., it is
'highest and best use' especiproperty for farming ....
degree that the price of the

land does not bear a reasonable relationship to its earning capacity . . . it (is) unreasonable
to require that this 'speculative value' be included in an estate with respect to land devoted
to farming ..
" H. R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976).
The Internal Revenue Code now provides that under certain conditions (designed to

make certain the benefit accrues only to the bona fide farmer and his successor in interest),
agricultural land may be valued in the decedent farmer's estate at its value for agricultural

purposes rather than its fair market value. I.R.C. §2032A.
70.

Nagel & Derr, A Preliminary Analysis of the Data on Participants in the New

fersey Farm Real Estate Market, 1966-1970 (N.J. Agricultural Experiment Station, Rut. U.,
February, 1972), cited in UNTAXINr- OPEN SPAcE, supra note 4, at 53 n.1.
71.

Peterson, Tax Policy and Land Conversion at the Urban Fringe (Urb. Inst., Land

Use Center Working Paper 0875-04, December, 1974), cited in UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra
note 4, at 53 n.2.
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process. Apparently, many sales or conversions of farm and open space land
are related to personal factors far removed from the burden the property
tax imposes and will occur with or without a differential tax program.
Moreover, a differential tax program will not encourage speculators to
keep their open space or farm land in its current use. The tax benefit that
speculators receive if their lands are eligible for special tax treatment may
permit them more flexibility in timing the conversion or sale of their land
in order to maximize their return. Open space may be preserved temporarily,
but this mere delay in the conversion of open space land would not seem
to be the type of preservation of land use for which the program was
intended and certainly furnishes no reason to establish or continue such a
program.
Differential tax programs are also unlikely to affect the decision of those
who are committed to maintaining their farm or open space use. The tax
reduction these schemes provide should increase the income of owners of
enrolled land. However, differential tax programs will not significantly
influence the land decisions of owners with a personal commitment to maintain their land in farm or open space uses.
An Analysis of the Impact of Differential
Taxation on the Maintenanca of Land in Farm
or Open Space Use
In the twenty-odd years that differential taxation has existed in this
country, it has been intensively studied. Yet because many current programs
are of recent origin, their impact on farm and open space land uses is still
in doubt. Moreover, studies that have been done focus almost exclusively on
the impact of differential taxation on the preservation of agricultural land
uses. Thus, whether this approach to land planning can succeed in preserving
other types of open space uses remains unsettled.
Arguably, open space land uses are of a character sufficiently different
from land in farm use that studies of the latter use would have little relevance
in evaluating the effectiveness of differential taxation in preserving open space
uses. For example, many owners of open space land may rely much less on
the income producing capability of their land than do the owners of agricultural land. Consequently, the profitability of the land in its current use,
taking into account the property tax, would not be as significant a factor in
the owner's decision whether to keep his land in its open space use.
Reports of the operation of differential tax schemes show a wide variation
in the percentage of land in a state that becomes enrolled in a tax relief
program. Some states include all land in the qualifying use and obviously
have full participation." One of the highest levels of participation is in the
state of Oregon, 73 due in part to the automatic preferential assessment afforded
all land zoned exclusively for agricultural uses. 74 However, Oregon farmers
72.
73.
Oregon
74.

See note 84 supra.
It has been estimated that from 75 to 90 percent of the eligible farmland in
is preferentially assessed. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 213.
See OR. REv. STAT, &38Q,37Q(L) (197.7)...
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whose land is not zoned exclusively for agricultural use can also apply for
special tax treatment.75 The high level of enrollment by those landowners
may be due in part to their perception that the manner in which use-value
is determined in Oregon yields some very low assessed values .7 The greater
the tax benefit, the more likely it is that eligible persons will avail themselves of the program.
Oregon's experience can be contrasted with states with similar or even
more attractive programs which nonetheless do not attract a significant amount
of land. For instance, in Kentucky, less than 1 percent of the total tax base
of farmland was enrolled in its program in 1973. 77 It is hard to determine
why more land has been enrolled in Oregon than in Kentucky. Both programs are of the deferred tax variety. In fact, the recapture of deferred taxes
is greater in Oregon than it is in Kentucky.78 This suggests that Kentucky's
program should be more desirable and more heavily used than Oregon's.
However, Oregon's program has been in existence several years longer than
Kentucky's and this longer existence has afforded the Oregon landowners
time to become better acquainted with the program. Perhaps the sizable
assessment reduction that occurs in Oregon when land is enrolled in that
program is not matched in Kentucky. If an informal use-value standard is
prevalent among Kentucky assessors, there would be less incentive for owners
of farmland to enroll in the program. These disparities among the states
in the level of participation in differential tax programs call for further study.
Beyond examining the success of differential tax schemes in enrolling
land, the characteristics of the land enrolled need to be scrutinized. Is such
land the prime farmland or the land in or close to the fringe of development
at which the program was directed from a land planning viewpoint? Although
not encouraging, studies generally conclude that land removed from the
fringe of development is more likely to be enrolled than land more proximate
to land already developed. °9 Further, differential tax programs are relatively
unsuccessful in halting the conversion of prime land from open space and
agricultural uses to suburban housing and commercial uses. 0
California's Williamson Act has been criticized because of the large percentage of enrolled land that is distant from areas that are ripe for develop75. OR. Rrv. STAT. 308.370(2) (1977). A large percentage of the preferentially assessed land
may not be zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note
4, at 217.
76. Henke reports that the income capitalization formula used in Oregon for calculating use-value has resulted in some dramatic decreases in market value of even remote
agricultural land, the value of which would presumably be unaffected by development
pressures. Henke. supra note 5, at 124-25.
77. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 46. In 1976, 100 of Kentucky's 120 counties applied
the use value assessment procedure to farmland and the tax base was approximately two
billion dollars less than if the land had been assessed at fair market value. Kentucky
Department of Revenue, Ky. Prop. Tax Newsletter 4 (October 1977).
78. Oregon requires repayment of ten years of tax benefit, OR. REV. STAT. §308.395

(1977); while Kentucky collects only two years back taxes, Ky.

REv. STAT.

§132.454 (1977).

79. E.g., Gustafson & Wallace, Differential Assessnent as Land Use Policy: The California Case, 41 AmP J. 379, 381 (1975).
80. See, e.g., UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 139-40, 159-60.
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ment.8 1 At the beginning of this decade a legislative report noted that only
6.4 percent of the land in the program was within three miles of a city and
less than 2 percent was within one mile of a city. 2 Subsequent studies have
not questioned the conclusion that the program has failed to enroll land
on the fringe of development8 3 In fact, Los Angeles County and San Francisco
County have not even taken the necessary legislative steps under the California law to qualify for participation in the program8 4 Other counties in
developing areas have among the lowest rates of participation in the state.85
The data from other states is scanty. However, the results of studies in
Virginia, Washington and New Jersey, indicate that California's experience
is not unique.8
The inability of differential taxation schemes to attract the land most
likely to be converted to suburban uses seriously undercuts the usefulness of
these programs in their present form as an aid to maintaining open space
and agricultural land uses. From a land planning perspective the critical
factor is not how much land is enrolled in a differential tax program but
whether the program halts or significantly slows the conversion of open land
to urban/suburban uses. Unfortunately, few studies have indicated that
success has been achieved.
The failure of differential taxation programs to deter the development
of open space and farmland, especially in the rural/urban fringe area, is
predictable for several reasons. First, many programs have failed to enroll
land that the community wishes to maintain in its current use. Tax relief
programs obviously will not deter development when owners decline their
benefits. Second, speculators and those deeply committed to farming will not
be significantly influenced by tax relief in their decisions regarding the use'
or sale of their property. Further, for those landowners who might be influenced by the tax relief provided in differential tax programs, personal considerations prove to be very important in decisions involving the sale or
development of property. Thus, since the pool of owners affected by differential tax schemes is much smaller than might have been thought, the impact
of such programs will be less than predicted.
Studies on the effectiveness of differential tax programs in maintaining
land in its current farm or open space use are most often in survey form
which asks owners of enrolled land the significance of the tax break in the
owner's decision to maintain the current use of his property. A frequently
cited study of the Washington program surveyed participants in that state's
program. Generally, the study concluded that the availability of the use-value
81. E.g., R. FELLMTH, PoLmcs OF LAND 42 (1973).
82.

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE JOINT COMMrrEE

ON

OPEN SPACE LAND, FINAL REPORT

116

(1970).
83. See generally, Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 79.
84. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 288. Local government action is required
as condition precedent for a landowner's participation in the program. The procedure
is briefly described in UNTAXING OPEN' SPACE, supra note 4, at 272-73.
85. Id. at 288-89.
86. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 5, at 47-51.
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assessment did not influence land use decisions and that only a few participants in the program would be influenced by the penalties associated with
the withdrawal of enrolled land from the program.8 7 This result is particularly significant because Washington has among the most severe recapture
and penalty provisions of all the programs that have been adopted. Thus,
even a stiff deterrent to the withdrawal of land from the program apparently
will not halt the conversion of land to urban/suburban uses.
One question that has not yet been directly addressed is how the type
of program adopted 8 will affect the preservation of land in open space or
agricultural uses. From a land use perspective the trade-offs between the
programs are fairly clear. Under a pure preferential assessment approach,
a large number of owners will participate. However, since there are no penalties for conversion to a non-qualifying use, the program itself is no deterrent
to development. At the other extreme, the restrictive agreement approach is
the most binding on the landowner and should be the greatest deterrent to
development. Yet, because of the restrictions on conversion to a non-qualifying
use, only those with a long-term commitment to farming or another qualifying
use will choose to enroll in. the program. Deferred tax programs occupy the
middle ground. The greater the recapture and other charges on conversion,
the lower the enrollment is likely to be. Lesser sanctions on conversion to a
non-qualifying use will encourage enrollment but will be less likely to deter
owners who are desirous of developing or selling their property.
Another significant matter not yet considered in this article is the effect
that a differential tax program will have on non-participating land in the
tax jurisdiction. Non-participation could result either from voluntary nonparticipation or from ineligibility under the requirements of the program.
Non-participants may assume larger shares of the tax burden when program
benefits are granted. This tax shifting, as noted earlier, may force early development of non-enrolled land or cause unwanted sprawl.8 9 Also, tax shifting
should be examined as it relates to the equity of differential tax programs.
Tax relief for qualifying landowners requires others to pay additional tax
to satisfy the revenue needs of the taxing entity. 90 This burden will be borne
by other property owners in the same area, not by all taxpayers in the state
87. J. Barron & J. Thompson, Impacts of Open Space Taxation in Washington, Wash.
\gricultural Experiment Station Bull. 772 (1973). It may be that the respondents did not
fully understand the operation of the penalty and rollback provision of the Washington
program. UNTAXINC. OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 54. Perhaps a fuller understanding of the
program might have caused more of the surveyed owners to indicate that the penalties
would discourage them from changing their land use. It might also have caused fewer
owners to enroll.
88. See notes 31-52 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
90. If services were reduced causing a decrease in revenue needs, other taxpayers would
not have to carry a disproportionate share of the tax burden. But this is an unlikely possibility. For empirical reports confirming tax shifting from enrolled land to non-enrolled
land, see Hady & Sibold, supra note 5, at 13-14; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, SUpra note 4, at
82-95; Carman 9: Poison, Tax Shifts Occurring as a Result of Differential Assessment of
Farmland: California 1968-69, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 449 (1971); Ching & Frick, Effect of Use
Value Assessment on Property Tax Rates, 52 Am. J. oF A;RIcuLTURAL ECON. 603 (1970).
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or any other group.91 The analysis of differential taxation and its impact in
this article centers on the effectiveness of differential taxation to achieve one
of its major goals - the maintenance of land in certain desired uses. If it
cannot accomplish this purpose, then the possible inequitable shifting of taxes
would be especially difficult to justify.
CONCLUSION

Differential tax programs are responsive to a number of public concerns.
This analysis emphasized the function differential taxation can play in preserving agricultural and open space land uses, especially at the urban fringe
where the pressure to develop land is intense. Focusing on this objective of
differential taxation programs is appropriate, because their general acceptability may depend to a great extent on the belief that this purpose is being
served. How much public support would there be for differential taxation
if it was promoted as an income maintenance program for farmers? As public
support turned to public opposition, how much legislative support would
these programs continue to receive?
When these programs were still in their infancy, Professor Hangman commented: "Too much of the present legislation constitutes a blatant tax
favoritism, clothed for acceptance and respectability with land use planning
motives.192 He proposed a number of specific measures to make the programs fairer and more likely to achieve their land use goals, 9 and suggested
that unless these reforms were forthcoming, "the results will be poor and
'' 4
adverse reaction to the movement will destroy it."
At that time fewer than
a dozen states had adopted differential tax programs. Now the number exceeds
forty.
Experience and study, as rep6rted in this article, have demonstrated the
accuracy of Hagman's early criticism. However, his prediction regarding the
plight of differential taxation programs has not come to pass, perhaps because
the general public believes that differential taxation is working to retard,
control and direct the development of land.9 5 These programs generally do
not require the appropriation of any money, a feature that makes the programs particularly attractive to legislatures which are anxious to show their
sensitivity to land use and environmental problems, but are wary of imposing
new taxes for such purposes.
Other reasons for the continued popularity of differential tax programs
may exist. The curious fact is that despite general agreement among those
91. Only California provides financial support at the state level for its differential
taxation programs. These subventions do not fully compensate counties and school districts
for lost property tax revenues, but they do reduce the severity of the impact. In the
1974-75 fiscal year, $24 million was appropriated for this purpose. See UNTAXNG OPEN
SPAcE, supra note 4, at 95-98; Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 79, at 381-82.
92. Hagman, supra note 11, at 657.
93. These proposals include the tying of the tax benefit to the planning activity, and
the implementation of controls on those individuals entitled to the benefit. Id. at 646-57.
94. Id. at 657.
95. Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 79, at 387.
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who have studied differential taxation programs regarding the failure of the
programs to maintain farm and open space land uses, the programs continue to be advertised as serving that purpose. Therefore, there is a hesitancy
to concede that some other way to preserve such land uses should be found.
It may be, of course, that while these programs fail as land use planning
tools, they serve other functions well. For instance, differential taxation eases
the income squeeze on farmers. In recent years, higher market value for farmland and consequent higher property taxes on farmland have not been
accompanied by higher incomes for farmers.96 An increased property tax burden exacerbates what farmers contend is already an unfair situation- that
they pay property taxes disproportionate to the public services they use that
are supposedly funded by the property tax. 9 7 A discussion of the need for
income maintenance for farmers and the fairness of the property tax are
beyond the scope of this article. However, if income maintenance for farmers
purpose of differential taxation programs, then these programs ought to be
analyzed in that context.
Differential taxation programs may continue to exist because they can be
used in land use planning in conjunction with other programs and laws,
even though they cannot do the job alone. For example, it is suggested that
differential tax programs could be used with zoning. 8 Zoning can force land
into the desired use. This would remove the "voluntariness" aspect of the
differential tax approach, an aspect that may frustrate its effectiveness.99 Of
course, zoning can accomplish that end whether or not it is used in conjunction
with differential taxation. Arguably, combining differential taxation with
zoning lessens the chances that zoning land to very low density uses such as
open space and agriculture will be found confiscatory and declared invalid.
Tax relief does reduce the holding costs of restrictively zoned land with a
high development value. But the zoning question remains whether such land
use restrictions can be justified as furthering the health, safety and general
welfare of the community. Although the substance of the question could be
seriously debated, courts have shown a willingness to accept open space and
environmental purposes as legitimate objectives of zoning.10 0 Moreover, they
GLOUDEMANS, sup'ra note 5, at 4-10; Henke, supra note 5, at 119.
97. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 4, at 80-82.
98. E.g., Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 79, at 386-87.
99. Id.
100. See generally, F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLmS & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973);
Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
In Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), one of the most radical
opinions in support of the right to restrict land use for open space, agricultural and
environmental purposes, the court said: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited
right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others. The
exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use
of private property to its natural uses." 56 Wisc. 2d at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. In Arverne
Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (.1938), Judge
Lehman distinguished a valid land use regulation from a taking for which compensation
must be paid: "the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of tax-

96. See R.
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have done so without tying the restriction to a tax reduction for the development value that has been "taken." Thus, zoning by itself may be able to
achieve the land use objectives offered to support differential tax programs.
One could assert that it is fairer to give landowners a tax reduction if the
community asks that their land use be so xestricted. Viewed this way, differ101
ential taxation is related to the concept of compensatory zoning. Although
the idea of combining differential taxation with zoning may have some merit,
it is questionable whether differential taxation programs should continue
to exist and benefit certain landowners at the expense of others during what
will be an extended debate over the proposition.
Another problem with the zoning-differential taxation union is that it
depends on zoning classifications remaining stable over time. Zoning has not
historically demonstrated a capacity to resist changes called for by owners and
developers responding to market demands. Can differential taxation assist
zoning and make it more likely that land zoned open space or agricultural
will remain so zoned? One of the previously discussed findings regarding the
performance of differential tax programs indicated that the programs are
unsuccessful in preserving open space or farm land in the face of development
pressures. Owners perceiving early development will not enroll in the program, while owners of land already enrolled will withdraw from the program
and pay whatever penalty is assessed when the right offer for their property
is made. Current zoning practices and proposed differential taxation programs
probably will not produce any better results when combined, because they
share a similar fundamental weakness: the inability to resist development
pressures.
One way to insure the maintenance of agricultural and open space land
in those uses would be through governmental acquisition of an interest in
such land. This acquisition could be accomplished by acquiring a full fee
102
These
interest in the property or the development rights for the property.
programs do cost money and they do involve the government in the ownership and development of private property, which may be undesirable.03 However, if the public wants land preserved in these uses, such an approach may
hold more promise than does differential taxation.
Obviously, a persuasive case can be made for abandoning differential
taxation programs as they currently exist. They are advertised, at least in
part, as a land use tool, yet studies have concluded that they do not succeed
as such. Moreover, there is little evidence that differential taxation can be
ation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden."
101.

See Hagman, Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Doman (ZSAFED), 28

U. FiA. L. REV. 655 (1976).
102. The range and variety of these programs is considered in Lapping, Bevins &
Herbers, supra note 11, at 392-406.
103. For an interesting discussion and analysis of the more direct and intense government involvement in land development and planning in Europe and how this participation

relates to the United States, see Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land Developers:
Notes on the Public Sector Experience in the Netherlands and California, 51 So. CAL.
L. REv. 165 (1978); Lefcoe, The Right to Develop Land: The German and Dutch Experience,
56 OR. L. Rav. 31 (1977).
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used with other land use planning devices to preserve more effectively the land
uses that are the targets of differential tax schemes. If such programs are
to be continued, it should be because they serve other important public
policies, such as supporting the income of farmers. Whether these programs
can serve such policies needs further study. Whether differential taxation
would survive if it were justified only on such bases is doubtful.
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